# 1

**Obama will win the debt ceiling fight now- his political strength is the key factor**

**Kapur 9/12**/2013 (Sahil, Talking Points Memo’s senior congressional reporter and Supreme Court correspondent. His articles covering politics and public policy have been published in The Huffington Post, The Guardian and The New Republic, Cantor: If We Can’t Defund Obamacare, Let’s Delay It, http://tpmdc.talkingpointsmemo.com/2013/09/eric-cantor-obamacare-debt-ceiling-shutdown-default.php)

In order to persuade conservatives lawmakers to vote to keep the federal government funded past Sept. 30, House **Republican leaders are proposing to stare down** President Barack **Obama over the debt ceiling by seeking a one-year delay of Obamacare.¶** At a closed-door meeting Tuesday, House Majority Leader Eric Cantor (R-VA) floated a strategy to delay the rollout of Obamacare for one year in exchange for lifting the debt ceiling. The meeting was focused on pitching a plan that lets Republicans vote to defund Obamacare without risking a government shutdown if the Senate rejects the idea, a move that is meeting fierce resistance on their right flank, which wants to go further.¶ A senior Republican aide familiar with Cantor’s remarks said he was essentially trying to persuade his members that the debt limit, which the federal government is expected to hit in mid-October, provides a better opportunity than a threatened government shutdown to undermine Obamacare.¶ “He didn’t draw any red lines,” said the GOP aide. “He said it’s a better opportunity than [the continuing resolution] and a delay there is very doable.” The aide added that the concession wouldn’t necessarily just involve Obamacare; there could be other reforms. The aide admitted that it depends in part on what the president is willing to give up.¶ **It all sounds far-fetched**. After all, trading a government shutdown for default would be like trading a common cold for cancer. And **it remains to be seen whether GOP leaders would let the economy collapse if they don’t get their way, or if they’re merely saying what they have to say to get through the shutdown crisis.**¶ An upside to proposing the debt ceiling idea now is that it helps persuade Republican lawmakers not to withhold their support for keeping the government open. Cantor’s suggestion this week comes as Republicans are taking heavy fire from conservative advocates for refraining from risking a government shutdown over Obamacare. House leaders have postponed consideration of the continuing resolution until next week to build support.¶ Last month, Speaker John **Boehner** (R-OH) **floated the idea of delaying or defunding the health care reform law in a debt ceiling package. But he, too, stopped short of drawing any red lines**. A leadership aide described it at the time as an “option.”¶ Despite the anti-Obamacare frenzy consuming their right flank, **Republican leaders recognize that both a shutdown and default would be a disaster for their party**, potentially threatening their House majority ahead of a mid-term election when they hope to win back the Senate. **Their balancing act to satisfy conservatives enough to avert a shutdown but not to create expectations that threatening debt default is the way to go.¶** Back in January, **when** President Barack **Obama held firm** and refused to negotiate **on the debt limit**, **as he is now**, **the House GOP backed down** **and lifted the debt ceiling without substantive concessions** (but rather symbolic ones). **Republican** **leaders recognize that it will be extremely difficult to extract major** Obamacare **concessions**, especially on the eve of its rollout. **The last-ditch option in** Speaker John **Boehner’s** (R-OH) **pocket would be to avert disaster by bringing up legislation that passes with the support of mostly Democrats. This route is far from ideal for him, but he hasn’t ruled it out**.¶ In a memo to Republicans last Friday, Cantor vowed to continue attacking Obamacare, but not necessarily at risk of wreaking havoc on the economy. Instead he promised that leaders will “hold a series of strategic votes throughout the fall to dismantle, defund, and delay Obamacare.” He said Republicans “will continue to pursue the strategy of systematically derailing this train wreck and replacing it with a patient-centered system.”¶ At the end of the day, **the battle over Obamacare is largely a side show** that Republican leaders have to deal with. The real fight, where Republicans have genuine leverage, is over how much the government will spend next fiscal year and whether Congress will make permanent the lower spending levels after the automatic cuts known as sequestration.

**The plan drains capital – Backlash and hostage taking on unrelated priority legislation is empirically proven, likely in future and specifically true for Rubio**

**LeoGrande, 12**

William M. LeoGrande School of Public Affairs American University, Professor of Government and a specialist in Latin American politics and U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America, Professor LeoGrande has been a frequent adviser to government and private sector agencies, 12/18/12, http://www.american.edu/clals/upload/LeoGrande-Fresh-Start.pdf

The Second Obama Administration Where in the executive branch will control over Cuba policy lie? **Political considerations played a major role in Obama's Cuba policy during the first term**, albeit not as preeminent a consideration as they were during the Clinton years. In 2009, **Obama's** new foreign policy **team** got off to a bad start when they **promised Senator Menendez that they would consult him before changing Cuba policy. That was the price he extracted for providing Senate Democrats with the 60 votes needed to break a Republican filibuster on a must-pass omnibus appropriations bill to keep the government operating. For the next four years, administration officials worked more closely with Menendez, who opposed** the sort of major **redirection of policy** Obama had promised, **than they did with senators** like John Kerry (D-Mass.), chair of the Foreign Relations Committee, **whose views were more in line** with the president's stated policy goals. **At the Department of State**, Assistant Secretary Arturo Valenzuela **favored initiatives to improve relations with Cuba**, but he **was stymied by indifference or resistance elsewhere in the bureaucracy**. Secretary Hillary Clinton, having staked out a tough position Cuba during the Democratic primary campaign, was **not inclined to be the driver for a new policy**. At the NSC, Senior Director for the Western Hemisphere Dan Restrepo, who advised **Obama** on **Latin America policy** during the 2008 campaign, **did his best to avoid the Cuba issue because it was so fraught with political danger. When the president finally approved** the resumption of people-to-people **travel** to Cuba, which Valenzuela had been pushing, **the White House political team delayed the announcement for several months at the behest of** Debbie Wasserman **Schultz. Any easing of** the travel **regulations**, she warned, **would hurt Democrats' prospects** in the upcoming mid-term elections.43 The White House shelved the new regulations until January 2011, and then announced them late Friday before a holiday weekend. Then, just a year later, the administration surrendered to Senator Rubio's demand that it limit the licensing of travel providers **in exchange for him dropping his hold on the appointment** of Valenzuela's replacement.44 With Obama in his final term and Vice-President Joe Biden unlikely to seek the Democratic nomination in 2016 (unlike the situation Clinton and Gore faced in their second term), politics will presumably play a less central role in deciding Cuba policy over the next four years. **There will still be the temptation**, however, **to sacrifice Cuba policy to mollify congressional conservatives, both Democrat and Republican, who are willing to hold other Obama initiatives hostage to extract concessions on Cuba**. **And since Obama has given in to such hostage-taking previously, the hostage-takers have a strong incentive to try the same tactic again.** The only way to break this cycle would be for the president to stand up to them and refuse to give in, as he did when they attempted to rollback his 2009 relaxation of restrictions on CubanAmerican travel and remittances. Much will depend on who makes up Obama's new foreign policy team, especially at the **Department of State**. John Kerry has been a strong advocate of a more open policy toward Cuba, and worked behind the scenes with the State Department **and USAID** to clean up the "democracy promotion" program targeting Cuba, as a way to win the release of Alan Gross. A new secretary is likely to bring new assistant secretaries, providing an opportunity to revitalize the **Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs,** which **has been thoroughly cowed by congressional hardliners**. But even with new players in place, does Cuba rise to the level of importance that would justify a major new initiative and the bruising battle with conservatives on the Hill? Major **policy changes that require a significant expenditure of political capital** rarely happen unless the urgency of the problem forces policymakers to take action.

**That burns up Obama’s limited leverage with House Republicans—PC is finite**

Moore, 9/10 --- Guardian's US finance and economics editor

(Heidi, 9/10/2013, “Syria: the great distraction; Obama is focused on a conflict abroad, but the fight he should be gearing up for is with Congress on America's economic security,” <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/sep/10/obama-syria-what-about-sequester)>)

Before President Obama speaks to the nation about Syria tonight, take a look at what this fall will look like inside America.¶ There are 49 million people in the country who suffered inadequate access to food in 2012, leaving the percentage of "food-insecure" Americans at about one-sixth of the US population. At the same time, Congress refused to pass food-stamp legislation this summer, pushing it off again and threatening draconian cuts.¶ The country will crash into the debt ceiling in mid-October, which would be an economic disaster, especially with a government shutdown looming at the same time. These are deadlines that Congress already learned two years ago not to toy with, but memories appear to be preciously short.¶ The Federal Reserve needs a new chief in three months, someone who will help the country confront its raging unemployment crisis that has left 12 million people without jobs. The president has promised to choose a warm body within the next three weeks, despite the fact that his top pick, Larry Summers, would likely spark an ugly confirmation battle – the "fight of the century," according to some – with a Congress already unwilling to do the President's bidding.¶ Congress was supposed to pass a farm bill this summer, but declined to do so even though the task is already two years late. As a result, the country has no farm bill, leaving agricultural subsidies up in the air, farmers uncertain about what their financial picture looks like, and a potential food crisis on the horizon.¶ The two main housing agencies, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, have been in limbo for four years and are desperately in need of reform that should start this fall, but there is scant attention to the problem.¶ These are the problems going unattended by the Obama administration while his aides and cabinet members have been wasting the nation's time making the rounds on television and Capitol Hill stumping for a profoundly unpopular war. The fact that all this chest-beating was for naught, and an easy solution seems on the horizon, belies the single-minded intensity that the Obama White House brought to its insistence on bombing Syria.¶ More than one wag has suggested, with the utmost reason, that if Obama had brought this kind of passion to domestic initiatives, the country would be in better condition right now. As it is, public policy is embarrassingly in shambles at home while the administration throws all of its resources and political capital behind a widely hated plan to get involved in a civil war overseas.¶ The upshot for the president may be that it's easier to wage war with a foreign power than go head-to-head with the US Congress, even as America suffers from neglect.¶ This is the paradox that President Obama is facing this fall, as he appears to turn his back on a number of crucial and urgent domestic initiatives in order to spend all of his meager political capital on striking Syria.¶ Syria does present a significant humanitarian crisis, which has been true for the past two years that the Obama administration has completely ignored the atrocities of Bashar al-Assad.¶ Two years is also roughly the same amount of time that key domestic initiatives have also gone ignored as Obama and Congress engage in petty battles for dominance and leave the country to run itself on a starvation diet imposed by sequestration cuts. Leon Panetta tells the story of how he tried to lobby against sequestration only to be told:¶ Leon, you don't understand. The Congress is resigned to failure.¶ Similarly, those on Wall Street, the Federal Reserve, those working at government agencies, and voters themselves have become all too practiced at ignoring the determined incompetence of those in Washington.¶ Political capital – the ability to horse-trade and win political favors from a receptive audience – is a finite resource in Washington. Pursuing misguided policies takes up time, but it also eats up credibility in asking for the next favor. It's fair to say that congressional Republicans, particularly in the House, have no love for Obama and are likely to oppose anything he supports. That's exactly the reason the White House should stop proposing policies as if it is scattering buckshot and focus with intensity on the domestic tasks it wants to accomplish, one at a time.**¶** The president is scheduled to speak six times this week, mostly about Syria. That includes evening news interviews, an address to the nation, and numerous other speeches. Behind the scenes, he is calling members of Congress to get them to fall into line. Secretary of State John Kerry is omnipresent, so ubiquitous on TV that it may be easier just to get him his own talk show called Syria Today.¶ It would be a treat to see White House aides lobbying as aggressively – and on as many talk shows – for a better food stamp bill, an end to the debt-ceiling drama, or a solution to the senseless sequestration cuts, as it is on what is clearly a useless boondoggle in Syria.¶ There's no reason to believe that Congress can have an all-consuming debate about Syria and then, somehow refreshed, return to a domestic agenda that has been as chaotic and urgent as any in recent memory. The President should have judged his options better. As it is, he should now judge his actions better.

**Debt freeze sparks food crisis**

Min ‘10 (David, Associate Director for Financial Markets Policy at the Center for American Progress, 2010 “The Big Freeze The Conservative Pledge to Freeze the Debt Ceiling Is a Looming Disaster”, 10/28/10, <http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/10/big_freeze.html>)

A freeze on the debt ceiling could erode confidence in U.S. Treasury bonds in a number of ways, creating further and wider panic in financial markets. First, by causing a disruption in the issuance of Treasury debt, as happened in 1995-96, a freeze would cause investors to seek alternative financial investments, even perhaps causing a run on Treasurys. Such a run would cause the cost of U.S. debt to soar, putting even more stress on our budget, and the resulting enormous capital flows would likely be highly destabilizing to global financial markets, potentially creating more asset bubbles and busts throughout the world. Second, the massive withdrawal of public spending that would occur would cause significant concern among institutional investors worldwide that the U.S. would swiftly enter a second, very deep, recession, raising concerns about the ability of the United States to repay its debt. Finally, the sheer recklessness of a debt freeze during these tenuous times would signal to already nervous investors that there was a significant amount of political risk, which could cause them to shy away from investing in the United States generally. Taken together, these factors would almost certainly result in a significant increase in the interest rates we currently pay on our national debt, currently just above 2.5 percent for a 10-year Treasury note. If in the near term these rates moved even to 5.9 percent, the long-term rate predicted by the Congressional Budget Office, then our interest payments would increase by more than double, to nearly $600 billion a year. These rates could climb even higher, if investors began to price in a “default risk” into Treasurys—something that reckless actions by Congress could potentially spark—thus greatly exacerbating our budget problems. The U.S. dollar, of course, is the world’s reserve currency in large part because of the depth and liquidity of the U.S. Treasury bond market. If this market is severely disrupted, and investors lost confidence in U.S. Treasurys, then it is unclear where nervous investors might go next. A sharp and swift move by investors out of U.S. Treasury bonds could be highly destabilizing, straining the already delicate global economy. Imagine, for example, if investors moved from sovereign debt into commodities, most of which are priced and traded in dollars. This could have the catastrophic impact of weakening the world’s largest economies while also raising the prices of the basic inputs (such as metals or food) that are necessary for economic growth. In short, a freeze on the debt ceiling would cause our interest payments to spike, making our budget situation even more problematic, while potentially triggering greater global instability—perhaps even a global economic depression.

**Food security causes global war**

**Brown ’09** (Lester, founder of the Worldwatch Institute, “The Geopolitics of Food Scarcity”, 2-11, <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,606937-2,00.html>)

The deteriorating world food situation is not occurring in a vacuum: it comes at a time when there is a growing backlog of unresolved problems, many of them associated with a failure by developing countries to slow population growth. Continuing population growth on a planet already overburdened with human demands is politically weakening scores of countries. Under stress, inter-nal social conflicts develop between differing religious, ethnic, tribal, and racial groups, sometimes leading to genocide as in Rwanda and Sudan. Nearly all of the projected 2.4 billion people to be added to world population by mid-century will be born in countries where agriculture's natural support systems are already deteriorating in the face of excessive demands. As water tables fall, soils erode, and temperatures rise in countries like India, Pakistan, Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Mexico, the risk of social collapse grows. We have entered a new era in international affairs: In the last century it was heavily armed superpowers that threatened security, but today it is failing states. It is not the concentration of power but its absence that now threatens us.

# 2

**Interpretation: Economic engagement must include conditional carrots and sticks.**

Helweg, Professor of Public Policy @ SMU, 2000 (Diana, Economic Strategy and National Security, p. 145)

Secretary of State Madeline K. Albright has argued that a U.S. policy of economic engagement with a country does not mean endorsement of its regime. In fact, the U.S. version of engagement is different from countries, such as France and Japan, which often practice a policy of unlimited economic engagement based on the rationale that unfettered trade and investment best promotes democratic values for the targeted nation, and financial success for themselves. By contrast, U.S.-"style" engagement must be coupled with a range of policy tools that includes the targeted use of economic restrictions. In other words, it is a variation of the traditional carrot and stick approach rather than one or the other.

Violation: the affirmative is unconditional.

**Predictable limits: forcing the plan to be conditional ensures a stable mechanism for negative ground.**

**Resolutional Consistency: US engagement implies the use of carrots and sticks.**

# 3

Economic engagement is inextricably linked to liberal thinking through its use of liberalization and integration as a means for creating peace making a critical analysis necessary to subvert the liberal orthodoxy’s security agenda.

Hurrell, professor of international relations, 98

[Andrew, July, International Affairs, Volume 74, Issue 3, “Security in Latin America”, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2624967, page 529-530, accessed 7/10/13, VJ]

The second assumption, which also reflects a deep-rooted strand of liberal thinking on international relations, is that economic liberalization and regional integration feed naturally and positively into the creation of a stable and secure regional order. In contrast to the strong claims of democratic peace theory, the links between economic interdependence and peace have always been more elusive and difficult either to demonstrate or to refute with any precision. The argument here is that, while there are certainly cases, most notably within Mercosur and the Southern Cone, where economic integration appears to have reinforced rapprochement between erstwhile rivals and assisted the creation of a more stable regional environment, at the same time successful economic regionalization can also be a significant potential problem for regional order and a source of negative security externalities which, if unmanaged, are likely to become more serious. The third assumption is that the agenda of regional security should be broadened to include issues such as drug trafficking, drug-related violence and criminality, migration and refugees, environmental degradation, and worsening public order in the face of different forms of internal violence. It is certainly the case that the most serious security problems and threats to regional order are domestic and transnational in nature. And yet the increasingly pervasive rhetoric of the new security agenda disguises or even obscures many complex and contested issues. Divergent understandings of the meaning, nature and implications of the new security agenda have important policy implications and are likely to impede effective regional responses. Since the end of the Cold War regional order and security have increasingly come to be defined in terms of the collective defence of democracy and the promotion of liberal economic reform and regional integration. These processes will, it is hoped, provide the foundations for the creation of a stronger sense of regional community and the establishment of a set of political structures within which specific security threats, both traditional (e.g. old-style border conflicts) and non-traditional (e.g. the privatization of violence, drugs, migration) can be tackled.2 I do not argue here that this liberal orthodoxy is wholly wrong. But I do suggest that it needs to be subjected to a much more critical analysis than has been common hitherto.

A refusal to problematize liberalism results in the subordination of everything deemed ‘non-liberal’ making war inevitable under the guise of the West’s ‘civilizing’ mission which in reality is a justification for imperialism.

Grayson, PhD in Political Science, 03

[Kyle, March, YCISS, “Democratic Peace Theory as Practice: (Re)Reading the Significance of Liberal Representations of War and Peace”, <http://yciss.info.yorku.ca/files/2012/06/WP22-Grayson.pdf>, accessed 7/1/13, VJ]

Given the representation practices embodied within the democratic peace theory discourse, it is best to view the interactions that it fosters as ‘imperial encounters’. According to Doty, ‘the term imperial encounters is meant to convey the idea of asymmetrical encounters in which one entity has been able to construct ‘realities’ that were taken seriously and acted upon and the other entity has been denied equal degrees of kinds of agency’.39 The ‘reality’ of democratic peace theory has been defined by Western representational practices outlined above. These representations have shaped the production of knowledge and identities as well as making particular courses of action appear possible/impossible/inevitable.40 Furthermore, to borrow a term from David Campbell, democratic peace theory has constructed a new ‘geography of evil’ that (re)produces national identity while dictating what courses of action are apt (i.e., conversion/force) when confronting the supposedly non-liberal/democratic ‘other’.41 To reiterate this point in a slightly different fashion, “the context of the democratic peace, then, includes not only the advent of a zone of peace among core states, but also international relations of domination and subordination in the periphery…”.42 As a result of this analysis, the answers to the questions of ‘for whom and for what purpose’ is democratic peace theory designed are now evident but not surprising. Democratic peace theory and its associated discourse is for the people of the US/West. Its purpose is to fix the American/Western national identity as civilized, peacefully inclined, and democratic with the non-West by definition being considered uncivilized, war-mongering, and authoritarian. Democratic peace theory also aids in the justification of the American/Western world-view which perceives both democracy and war in a particular fashion. In turn, these conceptions of democracy and war help to hide much of the sordid past and present of the international relations of western liberal democratic states. They help to justify the unjustifiable and to legitimate the illegitimate. Of utmost importance is the ontological basis of these international relations practices sanctioned by democratic peace theory and its associated discourse within the popular political realm. This is the focus of the following section which examines the existence of one of the empirical silences within democratic peace theory research and the consequences of ignoring these important events. Democratic Peace Theory and the Ontology of War and Peace In Violent Cartographies: Mapping Cultures of War, Michael Shapiro tries to examine “the ways that enmity-related global geographies and ethnoscapes emerge as collectivities, and how they try to achieve, stabilize, and reproduce their unity and coherence”.43 Historically, the practice of war has emerged as one the most enduring methods to attempt to fix national identities and ontological foundations. Victory in war confirms all the positive subjective views of the ‘self’ while at the same time providing ‘proof’ of the subjectively perceived inferior nature of the ‘other’. Conversely, defeat not only leads to (geo)strategic losses, but also to a reappraisal of the national identity and deep questioning of the foundations that helped define national identity. The American defeat in the Vietnam War provides an excellent example of these identity/foundation casualties. Therefore, Shapiro argues that war is not just (geo)strategic, but is also about the confrontation between competing ontologies. As mentioned earlier, democratic peace theory and its surrounding discourse views war as an activity waged by state actors in pursuit of (geo)strategic spoils (e.g., territory, resources, wealth), as well as an activity arising over disputes of ‘ownership’ of spoils and/or perceived violations of sovereignty. As John Vasquez has argued, “the situation that states in the modern global system are most likely to deal with by the use of force and violence is one in which their territory is threatened....territorial disputes provide the willingness to go to war”.44 Democratic peace theorists believe that liberal democracies can peacefully manage these kinds of disputes amongst themselves; however, in circumstances of dispute between a liberal democracy and a non-liberal/democracy, war is seen as almost inevitable. Conventionally, this has been attributed to the inherently aggressive nature of the ‘authoritarian’ state, which prevents liberal democracies from trusting these states to adhere to peacefully negotiated settlements. Yet, when democratic peace theory is viewed as a representational practice, war becomes inevitable between disputing liberal democratic states and non-liberal/democratic states not because of the aggressive nature of authoritarian regimes but because these situations are viewed as an opportunity for liberal democratic states to engage in a ‘civilizing’ mission and reaffirm their national identity and ontology by demonstrating their superiority in battle. This imperative becomes especially clear if we abandon the traditional view of wa

r contained within democratic peace theory and look at democratic non-state/liberal democratic state disputes and the underlying ontological contestations that fuelled them.45 Barkawi and Laffey have argued that currently “force is used in the service of defending and expanding economic and to a lesser extent political liberalism (in the guise of democracy) beyond the liberal capitalist core”.46 From a historical perspective, the dispute between the Iroquois Six Nations and the Canadian government over the Grand River territory during the first decades of the twentieth century, provides an excellent example of the ontological impetus behind international relations practices and how warfare can also be directed towards the annihilation of culture.

**The alternative is to reject the affirmative.**

A rejection is critical to reforming the securitized institutional apparatus through which the liberal peace operates to negate the non-liberal other into a localized form of democracy that engages the illiberal instead of obliterating it.

Richmond, Professor of International Relations, 09

[Oliver, July, Review of International Studies, Volume 35, Issue 03, “A Post Liberal Peace: Eirenism and the Everyday”, page 563-565, accessed 7/10/13, VJ]

Such a search, via critical research agendas for peace77 termed here eirenism. indicates the need for an ethical re-evaluation of the liberal peace.71 'Eirenism\* was used by Erasmus as a call against religious chauvinism after the Reformation.74 In a modem context it provides a lens through which one can evaluate the claims, apparent or hidden of a particular epistemology, concept, theory, method, or ideology. The failure to apply such a tool has led liberal peacebuilding approaches into a paradoxical situation. They have reinstated social and economic class systems, undermined democracy, and caused downward social mobility (as explained in the examples of East Timor and Afghanistan below). Yet. liberal peace's Renaissance and Enlightenment underpinnings make clear that the states-system of territorial sovereignty, the approximation of democracy, of human rights and free trade, also carries a humanist concern with social justice and wide-ranging pluralism (often to be guaranteed by an international organisation).75 Ironically, this is where its failings are most obvious. Its focus has remained on security and institutions, rather than developing an engagement with the everyday life of citizens. It has sometimes been built on force rather than consent, and more often conditionally, and it has failed to recognise local cultural norms and traditions. It has created a 'virtual peace' in its many theatres.76 This is not to say that narrow security issues have not been somewhat assuaged and that this has not been without benefit, of course. Experience and data from a range of UN and UNDP thematic or country focused reports has shown liberal peacebuilding to have less impact on everyday life than is often claimed by its institutional proponents, the donor and development communities, and particularly the International Financial Institutions. One example among many can be found in the context of East Timor after the crisis of 2006. A UN report conceded that despite a lengthy and costly UN involvement there since 1999: |.. | poverty and its associated deprivations including high urban unemployment and the absence of any prospect of meaningful involvement and employment opportunities in the foreseeable future, especially for young people have also contributed to the crisis.'' Vet there is little sense of a need to reflect on the underlying liberal peace paradigm that allowed a 'peace' to be built in East Timor which ignored these issues. In a more recent example, a report on Afghanistan by the UN Secretary General ignored any direct engagement with such issues in favour of traditional political and security concerns, with the exception of one telling reference: The failure of development actors to ensure that quieter provinces in the north and west receive a tangible peace dividend has played into the latent north-south fault line within Afghanistan [...f\* This report's later sections on development, human rights, and humanitarian issues or human security, focus on orthodox issues relating to institution-building or 'emergency' issues.79 In the conclusion to the report the full litany of liberal peacebuilding discourse is repeated in seeming ignorance of the lessons of East Timor, or indeed of Afghanistan itself. Accordingly, the transition in Afghanistan is under \*[.. .| increasing strain owing to insurgency, weak governance and the narco-economy'. The government needs to \*|...] restore confidence to the popu- lation in tangible ways\* but this is conceptualised as being derived from: |.. .| stronger leadership from the Government, greater donor coherence - including improved coordination between the military and civilian international engagement in Afghanistan - and a strong commitment from neighbouring countries, (without which) many of the security, institution-building and development gains made since the Bonn Conference may yet stall or even be reversed.10 This list of priorities, focusing on security, terrorism, narcotics, and then the orthodoxy of the liberal peace as a subsequent priority (governance, development, reconciliation, and human rights abuses in this order) effectively places a local peace dividend for communities and individuals as a distant and lesser priority, and disconnects its importance from the conduct of democratic politics and the legitimacy of the state.11 This is because the liberal peace's primary goal in its intervention into the local or domestic is actually on an international order between sovereign states. This is to be achieved ideally through the construction of a liberal social contract to produce domestic and international order. In practice, what has been achieved in post-conflict environments are the shells of liberal states, reproducing international order, but achieving a virtual peace in a domestic context - at least in the short to medium term, as the examples above, and of Cambodia and Bosnia aptly illustrate. The ethical and policy metanarratives about liberal peace derive from the founding myths of Westphalia, its state-centric elitism, its focus on territorial boundaries and sovereignty, and its disciplinary nature. Walker has described this as a 'moment of exclusion" The concept of peace has generally been subject to Utopian or dystopian assumptions, and the notion of the liberal peace has emerged as an 'auto-ambivalent' compromise." It has been imbued with a specific set of interests, partly through the decontextualisation of classical political theory to support inherency arguments about conflict, or confirm liberal norms of market- democracy, and propensity to reshape rather than engage with non-liberal others. This also validates territorial state sovereignty and a social contract skewed in favour of the slate, free markets, and the eradication of the indigenous or locally more authentic (often through property rights).34 among other tendencies.33 This has been used to promote a culture of governmental and securitised institutionalism rather than a broad peace (often by rejecting Kant's peace federation or by confirming territorial sovereignty).i6rather than promoting an everyday peace.37 It has supported the classical liberal view that liberal stales and peoples are effectively superior in rights and status to others, and extended these arguments to allow for the justification of direct or subtle forms of colonialism, interventionism. and local depoliticization to occur.38 A civil and emancipatory peace might arise through liberalism, as Foucault argued, but more often it leads to violence of a structural or direct nature in non-liberal contexts.39 In practice it also may have negative effects on self-determination and agency.40 In this context an ethical evaluation of the liberal peace underlines its tendency to be flimsy, denying self-determination and self-government, and depoliticising. This is as opposed to the potential of peace being empathetic. emancipatory, and resting upon an ontological agreement and hybridity (meaning the development of an ontology that is not exclusive but is open to difference).41 These latter qualities imply that the agents and recipients of the liberal peace are able to relate to each other on an everyday, human level, rather merely through problem-solving institutional frameworks that dictate or negate lived experience. They indicate the need for a deep negotiation of peace even by the agents of the liberal model, and for a willingness to see the Western liberal model itself modified by its engagement with its own 'others' - meaning conflict and post-conflict, especially non-Western, non-liberal, and 'developmental', polities.

# 4

**Plan: The United States Federal Government should remove every economic sanction against the Republic of Cuba excepting those outlines by section 1C997.**

**The plan removes restrictions on fertilizers in Cuba—our evidence cites legal code**

U.S. Department of Commerce ‘5

Bureau of Industry and Security. “Chapter 4: Anti-Terrorism Controls”. http://www.bis.doc.gov/policiesandregulations/05forpolcontrols/chap4\_antiterror.htm.

A. Pursuant to Section 6(j) of the Act, the Department of Commerce requires a license for the export or reexport of the following items to military or other sensitive end-users in all six designated terrorist-supporting countries for AT reasons:¶ All items subject to national security controls (Wassenaar Arrangement). [(7)](http://www.bis.doc.gov/policiesandregulations/05forpolcontrols/chap4_antiterror.htm#n_7_)¶ All items subject to chemical and biological weapons proliferation controls (Australia Group).¶ All items subject to missile-proliferation controls (Missile Technology Control Regime).¶ All items subject to nuclear weapons-proliferation controls (Nuclear Referral List).¶ All military-related items (items controlled by CCL entries ending with the number 18).¶ B. Pursuant to Section 6(a) of the Act, the Department of Commerce requires a license for the export of the following items to non-sensitive end-users in all six designated terrorist-supporting countries for AT reasons:¶ Aircraft, including helicopters and engines, and related spare parts and components controlled under 9A991.¶ Ammonium nitrate, including certain fertilizers containing ammonium nitrate controlled under 1C997.¶ Bearings and bearing systems controlled under 2A991.¶ Canopies, harnesses, and platforms controlled under 9A992.¶ Certain chemical mixtures controlled under 1C995.¶ Certain fluorocarbon compounds for cooling fluids for radar and supercomputers controlled under 1C006.d.¶ Commercial charges and devices controlled under 1C992.¶ Computer numerically controlled machine tools controlled under 2B991.¶ Computers for processing fingerprints controlled under 4A980.¶ Cryptographic, cryptanalytic, and cryptologic equipment controlled under 5A992.¶ Digital computers controlled under 4A994.¶ Electronic test equipment controlled under 3B992.¶ Equipment for test, inspection, or production of navigation or avionics equipment controlled under 7B994.¶ Explosives detection equipment controlled under 2A983.¶ Fibrous materials for use in composite structures controlled under 1C990.¶ Gear cutting machines controlled under 2B993.¶ General electronic equipment controlled under 3A992.¶ Gravity meters with static accuracy <100 microgal or with quartz elements controlled under 6A997.¶ Heavy-duty on-highway tractors controlled under 9A990.¶ Lasers controlled under 6A995.¶ Machine tool parts controlled under 2B998.¶ Magnetic or optical storage manufacturing equipment controlled under 4B994.¶ Magnetometers with sensitivity <1.0 nt rms per root hertz controlled under 6A996.¶ Manual dimensional inspection machines controlled under 2B996.¶ Marine and submarine engines controlled under 8A992.¶ Materials for production of hard drives controlled under 4C994.¶ Microprocessors with a clock speed greater then 25 MHz controlled under 4A994.¶ Navigation, direction finding, and radar equipment controlled under 7A994.¶ Non-numerically controlled machine tools controlled under 2B992.¶ Off-highway wheel tractors controlled under 9A990.¶ Optical materials controlled under 6C994.¶ Optical sensing fiber controlled under 6C992.¶ Optical sensors controlled under 6A992.¶ Optics controlled under 6A994.¶ Positive resists controlled under 3C992.¶ Preforms for optical fibers controlled under 5C991.¶ Protective and detection equipment and components controlled under 1A995.¶ Radar, systems, and equipment controlled under 6A998.¶ Robots employing feedback information in real time controlled under 2B997.¶ Semiconductor manufacturing equipment controlled under 3B991.¶ Specially designed tools for the manufacture or measure of gas turbine blades controlled under 9B991.¶ Specially designed tools to manufacture lasers controlled under 6B995.¶ Submersible systems controlled under 8A992.¶ Telecommunications test equipment controlled under 5B991.¶ Telecommunications transmission equipment controlled under 5A991.¶ Underwater photographic equipment controlled under 8A992.¶ Vaccines, immunotoxins, diagnostic, and food testing kits controlled under 1C991.¶ Vessels and boats including inflatable boats controlled under 8A992.¶ Vibration test equipment controlled under 9B990.¶ Software and technology for the items above may also be controlled¶

**Unique link: Removing trade sanctions opens the floodgate to Cuban pesticide usage. Pesticide runoff leads to widespread coral bleaching**

Wood ‘10

Kathleen Wood. Director of the Department of Environmental and Maritime Affairs of the Turks and Caicos Island. November 2010. “Environemntal Impact of Landscaping In The Princess Alexandra Park”. FP Turks and Caicos. http://www.fptci.com/index.php?option=com\_content&view=article&id=1982:environmental-impact-of-landscaping-in-the-princess-alexandra-national-park&catid=34:environment&Itemid=75.

This discovery led scientists to probe further, and they discovered that the embargo against Cuba for the past several decades and the fall of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s cut off Cuba’s access to chemical fertilizers, pesticides and herbicides, which in turn saved Cuban coral reefs from the calamity plaguing the rest of the planet.¶ What’s more is that during this time, Cuba also managed to grow all of its own food and to lushly landscape its resorts that are frequented by tourists from all over the world (with the exception of poor, deprived Americans).¶ These findings have profound implications for landscaping applications in our small island nation, which also relies heavily on tourism revenues largely derived from promoting a pristine environment.¶ Looking out into the azure waters of Grace Bay, it is difficult to imagine that pollutants are killing our coral reefs, but they are. The Turks and Caicos Islands have an admirable collection of environmental regulations that regulate the disposal of sewage effluent. Nowhere in this country is sewage disposed of at sea; however, a more insidious threat is at work that goes largely unregulated.¶ The artificially-placed, swaying coconut palm trees adorning Grace Bay and the vibrant climbing bougainvillea that is almost a landscaping must-have are foreign invaders from another ecological realm. Like a goldfish in the desert, the resort-style landscaping that most people crave cannot survive, much less look good, without extensive applications of water, fertilizer and pesticides. Once applied, landscaping chemicals seep into the sponge-like limestone bedrock. In Grace Bay, that same bedrock is saturated with groundwater that lies very close to the surface. The groundwater is like an underground river. Once chemicals enter the ground, they are slowly swept out into Grace Bay and onto the fragile fringing reef.¶ Grace Bay’s once pristine reefs are showing signs of severe distress. Coral die-off, coral bleaching and algal overgrowth are rampant. Much of these distressful symptoms can be directly attributed to the artificial landscaping that adorns the now uninterrupted wall of resorts that line the TCI’s most visited Princess Alexandra National Park.

**Cuban biodiversity loss spills over—Atlantic migration patterns are decimated**

Cohn ‘10

Jeffrey Cohn. Science writer. February 2010. “Opening Doors to Research in Cuba”. BioScience 60:2. Pgs 96-100.

Why should American biologists care about wildlife in Cuba, other than that we care about wildlife everywhere? What makes Cuba special? For one thing, as the largest island in the Caribbean—1200 kilometers (km) long by up to 240 km wide in some places—Cuba is a hot spot for biodiversity. Located at the confluence of the Atlantic Ocean, Caribbean Sea, and Gulf of Mexico, it features relatively clean waters and pristine beaches, as well as mangrove swamps, dry forests, and remote mountains. Southern Cuba, in particular, “is one of the few places that Columbus would recognize today,” says Stephen Cornelius, program officer for Latin America at the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation in Chicago.

Cuba ranks 10th in the world in reptile diversity with 91 species, including both American and Cuban crocodiles. Although few mammals inhabit the island, there are some unusual ones, such as hutias, which are capybara-like rodents, and solenodons, which are strange, shrewlike insectivores. Both are found only in the West Indies. Cuba also has some 285 species of birds, including the world’s smallest: the bee hummingbird. Twenty-five of Cuba’s bird species are found nowhere else, and 17 of these are endangered. Cuba’s flora includes about 100 species of palm trees. ¶ Cuba is also close: Only 145 km separate the Florida Keys from the northern coast of Cuba. As a result, Cuba and the United States share some of the same habitats and wildlife. Cuba’s Zapata Swamp, for example, with thousands of herons and other wading and water birds, is strikingly similar to the Florida Everglades. Most North American songbirds and raptors that migrate along the Atlantic Coast on their annual journeys to and from Latin America pass over Cuba, says Eduardo Inigo-Elias, a Cornell University ornithologist. Most stop on the island to rest and feed.¶ Most important, perhaps, is that US and Cuban waters contain many of the same fish and other marine species. At least 70 species of fish found in US waters also inhabit Cuban waters, Guggenheim says. Although currents, water depths, and weather complicate data collection, computer models and field studies have shown that at least some fish that hatch in Cuban waters can be carried as larvae by prevailing currents east by way of the Straits of Florida, and then north up the US Atlantic Coast. Similarly, some fish that hatch in US waters swim south to feed and breed in Cuban waters.¶ This is particularly true for large predators like sharks, says Robert Hueter, director of the Center for Shark Research at the Mote Marine Laboratory in Sarasota, Florida. All 54 shark species found in Cuban waters also inhabit US waters. Tagged whale and other sharks are known to have swum from Mexican to Cuban and then to US waters. “Assessing the status of sharks in US waters is not sufficient without knowing how they are doing in Cuba and Mexico,” Hueter says. ¶ Nor is biological connectivity limited to fishes. Manatees, large sea turtles, lobsters, and other marine animals have been tracked going between US and Cuban waters. Indeed, Cuba is a major breeding and feeding ground for the endangered loggerhead, hawksbill, and green turtles, says Fernando Bretos, a research fellow at the Ocean Foundation. Improved US–Cuba diplomatic relations could lead to joint programs to conserve sea turtles in both countries, Bretos adds. ¶ Meanwhile, the same coral reefs that dot the southeastern US coast are also found offshore Cuba. The only difference: Many of the US reefs are dead or dying, while most off Cuba are healthy. “Just seeing those [Cuban] reefs changed my life,” said Guggenheim. “We can learn lessons from Cuba on how to protect and restore coral reefs.” ¶ In other words, says Daniel Whittle, an EDF senior attorney and director of the conservation group’s Cuba program, “What happens in Cuba affects us, and what we do affects them. Even if we did a great job of managing our marine resources it wouldn’t be enough if Cuba did not do the same. We want to help Cuba become the next Costa Rica.”

**Loss of Coral Reefs leads to mass extinction**

Worldwatch Institute ’13 [“Coral Reef Loss Suggests Global Extinction Event”, http://www.worldwatch.org/node/5960]

The world is on the brink of a massive extinction event, according to the United Nations. Rapid releases of greenhouse gas emissions are changing habitats at a rate faster than many of the world's species can tolerate. "Indeed the world is currently facing a sixth wave of extinctions, mainly as a result of human impacts," said Achim Steiner, executive director of the U.N. Environment Programme in a statement. A study earlier this year in the Proceedings of the National Academies of Science said the current extinction period, known as the Holocene extinction event, may be the greatest event in the Earth's history and the first due to human actions. Unlike previous events, however, extinctions are happening over the course of decades rather than centuries. Recent studies suggest that a quarter of the world's species may go extinct by 2050. The UN warning accompanies an increasingly frequent round of sobering news about ecosystem failures. The latest global coral reef assessment estimates that 19 percent of the world's coral reefs are dead. Their major threats include warming sea-surface temperatures and expanding seawater acidification. Zooxanthellae, the tiny organisms that give coral reefs their vibrant colors, are emigrating from their hosts in massive numbers as oceans heat up, killing themselves and the coral they leave behind - a process known as coral bleaching. The report, released by the Global Coral Reef Monitoring Network Wednesday at the international climate change negotiations in Poznań, Poland, predicts that many of the remaining reefs may disappear within the next 40 years if current emission trends continue. "If nothing is done to substantially cut emissions, we could effectively lose coral reefs as we know them, with major coral extinctions," said Clive Wilkinson, the network's coordinator, in a press release. Overfishing, pollution, and invasive species continue to be risks as well, according to the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN). The IUCN declared in October that 38 percent of the 44,838 species it studied across the world are threatened with extinction. Its Red List of Threatened Species considers 22 percent of the world's mammals, 31 percent of amphibians, and 14 percent of birds threatened or extinct. Steiner's warnings of mass extinction came last week as the U.N. Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals added 21 migratory species to its protection list. Migratory species are among the most at-risk to climate change, according to a UNEP report released last year [PDF]. To its list of protected animals, which include the cheetah and Egyptian vulture, the convention added six dolphin species. Nearly one-quarter of the world's dolphin species are threatened with extinction, mostly due to habitat loss and live capture, according to IUCN. The demise of coral reefs, however, affects the entire ocean ecosystem - a quarter of all marine fish species reside in the reefs, according to The Nature Conservancy. In addition, IUCN estimates that 500 million people depend on coral reefs for their livelihoods. The coral reef assessment found that 45 percent of the world's reefs are healthy - providing hope that some species may be able to endure the changes expected from global warming. Marine biologists are now attempting to understand how certain coral reef species can survive warmer, more acidic ocean waters when others are less fortunate.

**Biodiversity Loss destroys habitats which causes extinction**

Takacs, 96 (David Takacs, Received a P.H.D from Cornell University, Genesis of Eden, Dhushara, 1996, http://www.dhushara.com/book/diversit/restor/takacs.htm)

More recently, Jane Lubchenco feels very strongly that people are in fact much more dependent on ecosystem services that are provided by both managed and unmanaged ecosystems than is generally perceived to be the case. So I think it's sheer folly for us to act in ways that are undermining the ability of both managed and unmanaged ecosystems to provide these services that we're depen dent on. And that we're doing that more and more as we pollute and destroy habitats, or alter habitats in one fashion or another. And I guess the bottom line is that we're changing the environment faster than our ability to understand the consequences of how we're changing it." "In every sense, in the sense of communities that will preserve soil, promote local climate, keep the atmosphere, preserve water, and every thing else, the first rule of being able to put together communities well or have the world go on functioning well, or to keep climates as they are, or to retard disease, to produce products we want sustainably, be cause, after all, plants, algae, and photosynthetic bacteria are the only device we have to capture energy from the sun effectively-in all those senses, and in the sense that we're losing the parts so rapidly, I con sider the loss of biological diversity to be the most serious problem that we have-far more serious than global climate change or stratospheric ozone depletion, or anything else." "Habitat destruction and conversion are eliminating species at such a frightening pace that extinction of many contemporary species and the systems they live in and support ... may lead to ecological disaster and severe alteration of the evolutionary process," Terry Erwin writes." And E. 0. Wilson notes: "The question I am asked most frequently about the diversity of life: if enough species are extinguished, will the ecosystem collapse, and will the extinction of most other species follow soon afterward? The only answer anyone can give is: possibly. By the time we find out, however, it might be too late. One planet, one experiment."" So biodiversity keeps the world running. It has value in and for itself, as well as for us. Raven, Erwin, and Wilson oblige us to think about the value of biodiversity for our own lives. The Ehrlichs' rivet-popper trope makes this same point; by eliminating rivets, we play Russian roulette with global ecology and human futures: "It is likely that destruction of the rich complex of species in the Amazon basin could trigger rapid changes in global climate patterns. Agriculture remains heavily dependent on stable climate, and human beings remain heavily dependent on food. By the end of the century the extinction of perhaps a million species in the Amazon basin could have entrained famines in which a billion human beings perished. And if our species is very unlucky, the famines could lead to a thermonuclear war, which could extinguish civilization."" Elsewhere, Ehrlich uses different particulars with no less drama: What then will happen if the current decimation of organic diversity continues? Crop yields will be more difficult to maintain in the face of climatic change, soil erosion, loss of dependable water supplies, decline of pollinators, and ever more serious assaults by pests. Conversion of productive land to wasteland will accelerate; deserts will continue their seemingly inexorable expansion. Air pollution will increase, and local climates will become harsher. Humanity will have to forgo many of the direct economic benefits it might have withdrawn from Earth's well stocked genetic library. It might, for example, miss out on a cure for cancer; but that will make little difference. As ecosystem services falter, mortality from respiratory and epidemic disease, natural disasters, and especially famine will lower life expectancies to the point where can cer (largely a disease of the elderly) will be unimportant. Humanity will bring upon itself consequences depressingly similar to those expected from a nuclear winter. Barring a nuclear conflict, it appears that civili zation will disappear some time before the end of the next century not with a bang but a whimper.

# 5

**Oil companies are making plans to drill in Cuba – the embargo is**

**the only obstacle to operations.**

**Claver-Carone, director of the US-Cuba Democracy PAC, 2008**

(Mauricio, “How the Cuban embargo protects the environment,” *The New York Times*, July 25,

Online: http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/25/opinion/25iht-edcarone.1.14793496.html)

For almost a decade now, **the Castro regime has been lauding offshore lease agreements**. It has¶ tried Norway's StatoilHydro, India's state-run Oil & Natural Gas Corporation, Malaysia's Petronas and¶ Canada's Sherritt International. **Yet, there is no current drilling activity off Cuba's coasts. The¶ Cuban government has announced plans to drill, then followed with postponements** in 2006,¶ 2007 and this year. Clearly**, foreign oil companies anticipate political changes** in Cuba **and are¶ trying to position themselves accordingly**. It is equally clear **they are encountering** legal and¶ **logistical obstacles preventing oil and gas exploration and development. Among the¶ impediments are** well-fou

nded **reservations as to how any new discovery can be turned into¶ product. Cuba has very limited refining capacity, and the U.S. embargo prevents sending¶ Cuban crude oil to American refineries. Neither is it financially** or logistically **viable for partners¶** of the current Cuban regime **to undertake deep-water exploration without access to U.S.¶ technology, which the embargo prohibits transferring to Cuba**. The prohibitions exist for good¶ reason. Fidel Castro expropriated U.S. oil company assets after taking control of Cuba and has never¶ provided compensation. Equally important, **foreign companies trying to do business with Cuba¶ still face a lot of expenses and political risks. If,** or when, **the Cuban regime decides again to¶ expropriate the assets of these companies, there is no legal recourse** in Cuba.

**Oil prices are high now – decline in production, Egyptian turmoil.**

DiLallo, 8/25 (Matthew, contributor at the Motley Fool, 8/25/13, The Motley Fool, “$200 Oil Prices: Fact or Fiction?,” <http://www.fool.com/investing/general/2013/08/25/200-oil-fact-or-fiction.aspx>, accessed 8/25/13, AS)

Fact: U.S. oil production this past July was 7.5 million barrels per day. That's the highest monthly output since 1991. It's now believed that in the U.S. oil production could exceed imports by October, which would be the first time since 1995. Production growth is being fueled by places such as the Eagle Ford Shale in Texas, where ConocoPhillips (NYSE: COP ) , for example, saw its production skyrocket by 98% in the past year. Despite booming production, oil prices are stubbornly high, and currently well over $100 per barrel. Globally, cracks are being felt in the world oil markets as turmoil in Egypt has oil traders nervous. Meanwhile, global oil giant ExxonMobil (NYSE: XOM ) for example, actually saw its production drop by 1.9% over the previous year, which, given its size, is a massive amount of oil. Despite spending billions, it simply cannot grow its oil production. It is this great dichotomy that has many wondering what to make of oil prices. The following slide show sheds some light on the future of oil and answers the question of whether $200 oil is fact or fiction.

**That causes Saudi Arabia to flood the oil market and collapse prices**

**MORSE AND RICHARDS 2002** (Edward L. Morse is Executive Adviser at Hess Energy Trading Company and was Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Energy Policy in 1979-81. James Richard is a portfolio manager at Firebird Management, an investment fund active in eastern Europe, Russia, and Central Asia, Foreign Affairs, March/April)

A simple fact explains this conclusion: 63 percent of the world's proven oil reserves are in the Middle East, 25 percent (or 261 billion barrels) in Saudi Arabia alone. As the largest single resource holder, Saudi Arabia has a unique petroleum policy that is designed to maximize the benefit of holding so much of the world's oil supply. Saudi Arabia's goal is to assure that oil's role in the international economy is maintained as long as possible. Hence Saudi policy has always denounced efforts by industrialized countries to wean themselves from oil dependence, whether through tax policy or regulation. Saudi strategy focuses on three different political arenas. The first involves the ties between the Saudi kingdom and other OPEC countries. The second concerns Riyadh's relationship with the non- OPEC producers: Mexico, Norway, and now Russia. Finally, there is Saudi Arabia's link to the major oil-importing regions -- most importantly North America, but also Europe and Asia. Given the size of the Saudi oil sector, the kingdom has a unique and critical role in setting world oil prices. Since its overriding objectives are maximizing revenues generated from oil export

s and extending the life of its petroleum reserves, Riyadh aims to keep prices high as long as possible. But the price cannot be so high that it stifles demand or encourages other competitive sources of supply. Nor can it be so low that the kingdom cannot achieve minimum revenue targets. The critical balancing act of Saudi foreign policy, therefore, is to maintain oil prices within a reasonable price band. Stopping oil prices from falling below the minimum level requires cooperation from other OPEC countries and occasionally from non-OPEC producers. Preventing oil prices from rising too high requires keeping enough spare production capacity to use in an emergency. This latter feature is the signal characteristic of Saudi policy. The kingdom can afford to maintain this spare capacity because of the abundance of its oil reserves and the comparatively low cost of developing and producing its reserve base. In today's soft market, in which Saudi Arabia produces around 7.4 mbd, the kingdom has close to 3 mbd of spare capacity. Its spare capacity is usually ample enough to entirely displace the production of another large oil-exporting country if supply is disrupted or a producer tries to reduce output to increase prices. Not only does this spare capacity help the kingdom keep prices in check, but it also serves to link Riyadh with the United States and other key oil-importing countries. It is a blunt instrument that makes policymakers elsewhere beholden to Riyadh for energy security. This spare capacity is greater than the total exports of all other oil-exporting countries -- except Russia. Saudi spare capacity is the energy equivalent of nuclear weapons, a powerful deterrent against those who try to challenge Saudi leadership and Saudi goals. It is also the centerpiece of the U.S.- Saudi relationship. The United States relies on that capacity as the cornerstone of its oil policy. That arrangement was fine as long as U.S. protection meant Riyadh would not "blackmail" Washington -- an assumption that is more difficult to accept after September 11. Saudi Arabia's OPEC partners must also cooperate with the kingdom in part to prevent Riyadh from producing a glut and having prices collapse; spare capacity also serves to pressure key non-OPEC producers to cooperate with Saudi Arabia when necessary. But unlike the nuclear deterrent, the Saudi weapon is actively used when required. The kingdom has periodically (and brutally) demonstrated that it can use its spare capacity to destroy exports from countries challenging its market share. This tactic is the weapon that Saudi Arabia could use if Moscow ignores Riyadh's requests for cooperation. Saudi Arabia has triggered its spare capacity twice in recent history, once when prices were especially low. Both cases demonstrated that the kingdom will accept those low prices so long as it suffers less than its targets do. In 1985, Saudi Arabia successfully waged a price war designed to force other oil producers to stop "free riding" on Saudi oil policy. That policy meant that those states had to cooperate with the kingdom by reining in production enough to allow Saudi Arabia to produce the minimum level that it targeted. Oil prices fell by more than half within a few months, and Saudi Arabia immediately regained the market share it had lost in the preceding four years, mainly to non-OPEC countries.

That crushes the Russian economy and undermines support for the regime

**KRAMER 12** – New York Times writer and editor (ANDREW E. “Higher Oil Prices to Pay for Campaign Promises” New York Times March 16, 2012 http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/17/business/global/vladimir-putins-big-promises-need-fueling-by-high-oil-prices.html?\_r=2?pagewanted=print Putin Needs ajones)

MOSCOW — In American presidential politics, high oil prices are a problem. For Vladimir V. Putin’s new presidential term in Russia, they will be a necessity — crucial to fulfilling his campaign promises to lift government spending by billions of dollars a year. But doing that without busting the Kremlin’s budget would require oil to reach and sustain a price it has never yet achieved — $150 a barrel, according to one estimate by Citigroup. No wonder economists who specialize in Russia are skeptical. (On Friday, Russia’s Ural Blend export-grade oil was trading at $120 on the global spot market.) “It’s very hard to overestimate how vulnerable the Russian economy is to external pressures” from the oil price, Sergei Guriev, the rector of the New Economic School in Moscow, said in a telephone interview. “That vulnerability is huge, which is why Russia must be very vigilant. The spending is a risk.” The promised spending is also ambitious. Mr. Putin has laid out a program of raising wages for doctors and teachers, padding retirement checks for everyone and refurbishing Russia’s military arsenal. The oil-lubricated offerings would even include a population premium: expanding the popular “baby bonus” payments the Russian government provides to mothers, to include a third child. The payment, of up to $8,300 for housing or baby-related expenses, now comes as an incentive only with each of the first two children. The additional cost of the expanded baby benefits alone will total $4.6 billion a year, according to an estimate by the Higher School of Economics in Moscow. Most of Mr. Putin’s spending promises came at least partly in response to the street demonstrations by young and middle-class protesters in Moscow and other big cities challenging his authority in the weeks leading up to the March 4 election. His apparent aim was to shore up support from the rest of Russia:

and rural parts of the country, and from state workers and the elderly. The repercussions of his campaign promises, and an earlier commitment on military spending, could be felt for years to come, giving price swings in oil a bigger role than ever on the Russian economy. Taxes on oil and natural gas sales provide half of Russia’s government revenue. Each increase in the Russian budget equivalent to 1 percent of the gross domestic product requires a rise in the price of oil of about $10 a barrel on global markets — which is how Citigroup arrived at the $150-a-barrel figure for meeting the new obligations Mr. Putin has taken on. Analysts worry that, even if the government can fulfill its promises, too little will remain for a sovereign wealth fund that is intended as a shock absorber for the Russian economy and the ruble exchange rate during an oil price slump. Russia needed to use that buffer as recently as 2008, during the financial crisis. “The concern is simple,” Kingsmill Bond, the chief strategist at Citigroup in Russia, said in a telephone interview. “If the oil price that Russia requires to balance its budget is higher, the systemic risks that the market faces are also higher.” The bank estimated that Mr. Putin’s promises of higher wages and pensions, not counting the military outlays, add up to additional spending equal to 1.5 percent of Russia’s gross domestic product. That comes on top of an earlier pledge to spend an additional 3 percent of gross domestic product a year re-arming the military. In all, the new commitments would add up to about $98 billion a year, Citigroup estimates. The spillover from the Arab Spring and the specter of an Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear development plants are propping up oil prices now. But over the long term, economic stagnation in Europe could help bring them down. Even before the election, Russia’s government spending was up, helping reinforce Mr. Putin’s message that he was the best candidate to deliver prosperity and stability. In January, the Russian military ministry, for example, doubled salaries in the nation’s million-person army. It was ostensibly a long-planned move. But coming just two months before the presidential vote, the political message was clear. Also smoothing the path for Mr. Putin’s victory was a national cap on utility rates that helped keep inflation at the lowest level in Russia’s post-Soviet history for January and February, at a 3.7 percent annual pace. “Putin made large spending commitments,” the Fitch rating agency said in a statement released the day after the election. “The current high price of oil cushions Russia’s public finances,” Fitch said. “But in the absence of fiscal tightening that significantly cuts the non-oil and gas fiscal deficit, a severe and sustained drop in the oil price would have a damaging impact on the Russian economy and public finances and would likely lead to a downgrade” of the nation’s credit rating. As Mr. Putin’s spending promises started to be introduced in January, Fitch altered Russia’s outlook to stable, from positive. Mr. Putin has defended the proposed spending as necessary and just, given the hardship of teachers and other public sector workers in the post-Soviet years. “A doctor, a teacher, a professor, these people should make enough money where they work so they don’t have to look for a side job,” Mr. Putin wrote in a manifesto published during the campaign. But in fact, the government will offset a portion of the pay raises, perhaps as much as one-third of their cost, by laying off some public sector workers and trimming some other public spending. That was the word from Lev I. Yakobson, the deputy rector of the Higher School of Economics, who helped draft the policy. That part of the plan, though, was never part of Mr. Putin’s stump speech.

**Russian weakness causes nuclear war, prolif, disease, terrorism, CBW use, world economic collapse, and US intervention**

**OLIKER AND CHARLICK-PALEY 2002** (Olga and Tanya, RAND Corporation Project Air Force, “Assessing Russia’s Decline,” www.rand.org/pubs/monograph\_reports/MR1442/)

The preceding chapters have illustrated the ways in which Russia’s decline affects that country and may evolve into challenges and dangers that extend well beyond its borders. The political factors of decline may make Russia a less stable international actor and other factors may increase the risk of internal unrest. Together and separately, they increase the risk of conflict and the potential scope of other imaginable disasters. The trends of regionalization, particularly the disparate rates of economic growth among regions, combined with the politicization of regional economic and military interests, will be important to watch. The potential for locale, or possibly ethnicity, to serve as a rallying point for internal conflict is low at present, but these factors have the potential to feed into precisely the cycle of instability that political scientists have identified as making states in transition to democracy more likely to become involved in war. These factors also increase the potential for domestic turmoil, which further increases the risk of international conflict

t, for instance if Moscow seeks to united a divided nation and/or demonstrate globally that its waning power remains something to be reckoned with. Given Russia’s conventional weakness, an increased risk of conflict carries with it an increased risk of nuclear weapons use, and Russia’s demographic situation increases the potential for a major epidemic with possible implications for Europe and perhaps beyond. The dangers posed by Russia’s civilian and military nuclear weapons complex, aside from the threat of nuclear weapons use, create a real risk of proliferation of weapons or weapons materials to terrorist groups, as well as perpetuating an increasing risk of accident at one of Russia’s nuclear power plants or other facilities. These elements touch upon key security interests, thus raising serious concerns for the United States. A declining Russia increases the likelihood of conflict—internal or otherwise—and the general deterioration that Russia has in common with “failing” states raises serious questions about its capacity to respond to an emerging crisis. A crisis in large, populous, and nuclear-armed Russia can easily affect the interests of the United States and its allies. In response to such a scenario, the United States, whether alone or as part of a larger coalition, could be asked to send military forces to the area in and around Russia. This chapter will explore a handful of scenarios that could call for U.S. involvement. A wide range of crisis scenarios can be reasonably extrapolated from the trends implicit in Russia’s decline. A notional list includes: Authorized or unauthorized belligerent actions by Russia troops in trouble-prone Russian regions or in neighboring states could lead to armed conflict. Border clashes with China in the Russian Far East or between Russia and Ukraine, the Baltic states, Kazakhstan, or another neighbor could escalate into interstate combat. Nuclear-armed terrorists based in Russia or using weapons or materials diverted from Russian facilities could threaten Russia, Europe, Asia, or the United States. Civil war in Russia could involve fighting near storage sties for nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and agents, risking large-scale contamination and humanitarian disaster. A nuclear accident at a power plant or facility could endanger life and health in Russia and neighboring states. A chemical accident at a plant or nuclear or nuclear-related facility could endanger life and health in Rusisa and neighboring states. Ethnic pogrom in south Russia could force refugees into Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and/or Ukraine. Economic and ethnic conflicts in Caucasus could erupt into armed clashes, which would endanger oil and gas pipelines in the region. A massive ecological disaster such as an earthquake, famine, or epidemic could spawn refugees and spread illness and death across borders. An increasingly criminalized Russian economy could create a safe haven for crime or even terrorist-linked groups. From this base, criminals, drug traders, and terrorists could threaten the people and economies of Europe, Asia, and the United States. Accelerated Russian weapons and technology sales or unauthorized diversion could foster the proliferation of weapons and weapon materials to rogue states and nonstate terrorist actors, increasing the risk of nuclear war.

# Transition

**The economy is growing in all sectors**

HT 7-7 (Havana Times, “Cuban Gov. Presents “Favorable” Stats” <http://www.havanatimes.org/?p=95985> 7-7-13)

The economy showed an overall a “favorable performance”, said Yzquierdo. Almost all sectors recorded growth, “including trade, transport, communications and manufacturing,” he noted.¶ Yzquierdo said the Cuban trade balance was positive at the end of the first quarter and pointed to a similar trend for year-end. At the same time, he spoke of a “slowdown” in the global economic situation.¶ Cuba recently reduced its forecasts for annual growth in 2013 from the 3.6 percent initially estimated to somewhere between 2.5 and 3.0 percent. He emphasized that the evolution of gross domestic product (GDP) has been influenced by the crisis in the international arena.¶ In the first semester, the island’s economy grew 2.3 percent, according Yzquierdo, despite “external stress”, the “internal weaknesses” and the effects of Hurricane “Sandy”, which swept across the east of Cuba in October 2012.¶ “Sandy” affected 11 provinces and caused losses of almost 7 billion dollars, according to the minister.¶ The inaugural session of the eighth legislature of the National Assembly of People’s Power closes on, Sunday. Raul Castro is expected to pronounce in a speech to the parliament.¶ In a Communist Party Central Committee meeting last week, Castro came down hard on what he called “indiscipline and illegalities” in the State apparatus. He will most likely refer to the fight against corruption, one of the banner efforts of his administration.

**Lifting the embargo would only harden the Catro regimes grip on the Cuban people.**

Radosh 2013 (Ron professional historian and author of 15 books. “[The Time to Help Cuba’s Brave Dissidents Is Now: Why the Embargo Must Not be Lifted](http://pjmedia.com/ronradosh/2013/03/18/the-time-to-help-cubas-brave-dissidents-is-now-why-the-embargo-must-not-be-lifted/),” <http://pjmedia.com/ronradosh/2013/03/18/the-time-to-help-cubas-brave-dissidents-is-now-why-the-embargo-must-not-be-lifted/?singlepage=true>)

Another brave group of Cuban opponents of the regime has actually taped a television interview filmed illegally in Havana. “Young Cuban democracy leader Antonio Rodiles,” an American support group called [Capitol Hill Cubans](http://www.capitolhillcubans.com/2013/03/cuban-democracy-leaders-stress.html) has reported, “has just released the latest episode of his civil society project Estado de Sats (filmed within Cuba), where he discusses the importance U.S. sanctions policy with two of Cuba’s most renowned opposition activists and former political prisoners, Guillermo Fariñas and Jose Daniel Ferrer.”¶ The argument they present is aimed directly at those on the left in the United States, some of whom think they are helping democracy in Cuba by calling for an end to the embargo. In strong and clear language, the two dissidents say the followingIf at this time, the [economic] need of the Cuban government is satisfied through financial credits and the lifting of the embargo, repression would increase, it would allow for a continuation of the Castro’s society, totalitarianism would strengthen its hold and philosophically, it would just be immoral … If you did an opinion poll among Cuban opposition activists, the majority would be in favor of not lifting the embargo.

Every invasion of freedom must be rejected.

**Petro -74** (Sylvester Petro, professor of law, Wake Forest University, Spring 1974, TOLEDO LAW REVIEW, p. 480.)

However, one may still insist, echoing Ernest Hemingway – “I believe in only one thing: liberty.” And it is always well to bear in mind David Hume’s observation: “**It is seldom that liberty** of any kind **is lost all at once.” Thus, it is unacceptable to say that the invasion of one aspect of freedom is of no import because there have been invasions of so many other aspects. That road leads to** chaos, **tyranny**, despotism, **and the end of all human aspiration**. Ask Solzhenitsyn. Ask Milovan Djilas. In sum, **if one believes in freedom as a supreme value**, and the proper ordering principle for any society aiming to maximize spiritual and material welfare, then **every invasion of freedom must be emphatically identified and resisted with undying spirit**

**SQUO solves better – political pressure is building now to change the regime’s practices.**

Poblete, Federal Government Law & Strategy/Policy Analyst attorney, 13

[Jason, 6-23-13, DC Dispatches, “Edward Snowden May Be Cuba or Latin America Bound … Cuba Keeps Earning its Place on the State Sponsors of Terror List,” <http://jasonpoblete.com/2013/06/23/edward-snowden-may-be-cuba-bound-cuba-keeps-earning-its-place-on-the-state-sponsors-of-terror-list/>, accessed 6-29-13, PR]

Interestingly, not once throughout the CSIS panel did any of the speakers discuss that U.S. law toward Cuba requires a two-prong approach: (1) helping the Cuban people and (2) isolating the Cuban regime. They focused only on prong (1). We could go on and on. Reach your own conclusions. Folks who support removing Cuba from the list are mainly people who oppose current U.S. policy. It is that simple. They are trying to make it political because it advances, in their minds, a path forward to ease sanctions on the regime. The reality is that the political ball is in Cuba’s court, not the United States. The regime knows what it has to do and it choses not to change its ways. For now, a “small sector in Miami and DC” (as people said several times during the CSIS conference) will continue to advance efforts to isolate the Cuban regime as well as support the people of Cuba. That is a good thing. If we want to reach agreement on outstanding questions such as U.S. property claims against Cuba, Cuba’s debt, and much more (see my list as to why Cuba should stay on the terrorism list), we need to maintain a firm hand. Study the history of modern, and not so modern dictatorships, and one thing stands out: they crumble sooner or later. The Castro brothers have lasted longer than most because Cuba is an island. Literally, an island in the middle of the Caribbean. In prior times, Cuba was important for Western Hemisphere geo-strategic purposes, but the U.S. can make due with the status quo. Just look at the last five decades. The U.S. has managed just fine without Cuba and, as a bonus, we even maintain a military base there. We can argue ad nauseam who was right and what policy was not, but we won. That is all that matters. It is now up to the regime to decide how it wants to spend its waning days. Why do some people insist on handing over to Cuban one propaganda victory over another over another? That is what we do every time the U.S. weakens some component of U.S. policy. The have been trying to do so since the Bush Administration. If Edward Snowden is headed to Cuba, he will become yet another token of the regime’s resistance to the U.S. The thing is, the Cuban people on the island are growing very impatient and the regime is running out of political tricks. We should take advantage of this political pressure cooker and increase economic sanctions once and for all. Then and only then will the Cubans regime come to its senses. And, if Snowden is not going to Cuba but to some other country in the Western Hemisphere, I can all but guarantee that Cuba is somehow lending a hand to make it so.

**Remittances solve growth in Cuba**

Chavez 13 (Juan Carlos Chavez, “Remittances from Cubans abroad drive the island’s economy” <http://www.miamiherald.com/2013/06/12/3448098/remittances-from-cubans-abroad.html> 6-12-13)

Cash remittances to Cuba in 2012 surpassed all revenue coming from the main components of the Cuban economy while becoming the largest element of support to the retail market, according to a study by a Miami-based analysis group.¶ The study, titled “Remittances to Cuba: the Most Powerful Engine of the Cuban Economy,” was done by The Havana Consulting Group. It concludes that in 2012, remittances reached $2.605 billion.

The number represents an increase of more than 13 percent compared to the previous year of nearly $2.3 billion.¶ “Today remittances to the island reach 62 percent of Cuban homes, support close to 90 percent of the retail market and allow employment of tens of thousands of people,” the study says.¶ The remarkable upward trend has also been a common denominator in goods (electrical appliances, clothes and consumer items, among others) that Cubans abroad ship to relatives or friends in Cuba. This category amounted to $2.5 billion in 2012, according to the study. Both categories (money and goods) together surpassed $5.105 billion.¶ “The remittances have left behind the powerful sugar industry ($391 million) — which by 1993 had entered its biggest crisis and it is still in decline — they surpass tourism ($2.613 billion) in volume and performance, provide more revenue than nickel exports ($1.413 billion) and the pharmaceuticals produced by the Cuban biotechnological industry ($500 million),” the study says. “And this without subtracting costs in each category, which would make the difference significantly larger.”¶ The injection of remittances has been a powerful pillar for the country’s economy, which has been practically stagnant and with high levels of unemployment. But it’s role has now been strengthened because of the deteriorating economy, according to experts familiar with the issue.¶ In October 2010, the Cuban crisis forced Raúl Castro’s government to launch market reforms and other emergency initiatives. The reforms, which a large part of the opposition calls “insufficient” and “cosmetic,” include a larger participation of foreign investment, self-employment and services in dozens of labor categories.

**Instability doesn’t spillover – empirics**

Mesa-Lago and Vidal-Alejandro 10 (Carmelo Mesa-Lago, distinguished Service Professor Emeritus of Economics and Latin American Studies at the University of Pittsburgh; and Pavel Vidal-Alejandro, Centro de Estudios sobre la Economia Cubana, “The Impact of the Global Crisis on¶ Cuba’s Economy and Social Welfare” <http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=1&fid=7957006&jid=LAS&volumeId=42&issueId=04&aid=7957004> November 2010)

The global ﬁnancial–economic crisis that began in 2008 generated transmission mechanisms from developed to developing economies that were in¶ turn conditioned by domestic factors that might attenuate or accentuate the¶ economic and social eﬀects of the recession. Cuba is a special case, however.¶ It is an open economy in the sense that it is exposed to trade-growth transmission mechanisms, but its socialist centralised economy and widespread¶ free social services may attenuate the eﬀects of the crisis.1¶ The Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean’s¶ (ECLAC) preliminary 2009 report noted that the strongest eﬀects of the¶ global crisis on the region were channelled not through the ﬁnancial sector¶ but through the economy, by a decline in exports, commodity prices,¶ remittances, tourism and foreign direct investment. The Latin American¶ countries’ ﬁnancial systems did not deteriorate, currency markets were relatively calm, and external obligations were met:¶ The emergence from this crisis has been quicker than expected, largely thanks to the¶ ramparts that the countries of the region had built through sounder macroeconomic¶ policy management \_ The Latin American economies went into the crisis with¶ unprecedented liquidity and solvency\_ The positive stimulus of ﬁscal policy action¶ was one of the distinctive features of economic management in 2009.2¶ The Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) report on the impact of the¶ global crisis concluded that the region avoided the currency and debt crises¶ and bank runs so typical of previous episodes of global ﬁnancial turbulence¶ thanks to the strength of its macro-economic fundamentals: low inﬂation,¶ twin external and ﬁscal surpluses, a sound banking system, a large stock of¶ international reserves, and more ﬂexible exchange rate regimes. These¶ strengths allowed governments to respond with counter-cyclical monetary,¶ ﬁscal and credit policies to mitigate the adverse impact of the global crisis. In¶ addition, a key innovation in this episode of global ﬁnancial turbulence was¶ the readiness of the world community to act as an international lender of last¶ resort by providing assistance to emerging markets.3

**Lifting the embargo wouldn’t help the Cuban people-internal blockades**

Carter, Washington Times Writer, 2k

(Tom, Sept 21, 2000 Cubanet, “Doctors testify lifting Cuba sanctions would not help average citizens” <http://www.cubanet.org/CNews/y00/sep00/21e6.htm>, accessed 7/9/13, KR)

Lifting the U.S. economic embargo to allow the sale of food and medicine to Cuba will do nothing to help the average Cuban, two doctors who recently defected from the island nation testified on Capitol Hill yesterday. ¶ "We consider that only cutting the umbilical cord that sustains [Cuban President Fidel Castro's] empire, and by this we mean suspending any external aid, we can suffocate the malignancy that is killing [the Cuban people] today," said Dr. Leonel Cordova, 31, a general practitioner from Havana, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.¶ Speaking as a doctor who served his patients, he said he believed no food or medicine sent from the United States would help the Cuban people if it went through a government organization.¶ "The U.S. embargo on Cuba does not affect the people of Cuba. The revolutionary leaders have everything, every kind of medicine from the United States," said Dr. Cordova, who defected in May while on a medical mission to Zimbabwe. "No food or medicine will reach the people. It is all funneled through the Cuban government for high-level Communist officials and tourists."¶ At a luncheon at the Heritage Foundation earlier, Dr. Noris Pena, a dentist who also defected in Zimbabwe, elaborated.¶ "It is not the external embargo that is the problem with Cuba's medical system, it is the internal blockade. With or without the U.S. embargo, the Cuban people will suffer," she said

**Their Gorrell evidence doesn’t make a spillover claim either – it just says political transformation in Cuba may allow US to assert it’s power. It’s also from 2005 which means no terminal uniqueness**

**No nuclear escalation and outside powers will stay out**

Roger **Cliff,** Ph.D. in international relations, Princeton, M.A. in history (Chinese studies), University of California, San Diego, Assistant for Strategy Development, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and David A. **Shlapak**, Ph.D., senior international policy analyst, RAND Project Air Force Report, 200**7**

This situation would occur if China attempted to use force to achieve unification, the United States intervened, and China’s efforts were defeated, but Beijing refused to accept Taiwan’s independence.10 Analysis at RAND has found that a conflict between the United States and China over Taiwan would likely be confined to the use of conventional weapons, even though both the United States and China possess nuclear weapons, and that it would not likely escalate into a broader war between the United States and China. That is, the war would be contained in the area around Taiwan; the main combatants would probably be limited to the United States, China, and Japan; and active hostilities would probably end after a relatively short time. Nonetheless, such a war would probably result in a bitter relationship between the United States and China, comparable in some ways to that between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. China might well accelerate the buildup of its military capabilities with an eye toward waging a second, this time successful, campaign to claim Taiwan. This military competition would likely also be accompanied by a broader deterioration in Sino-U.S. relations, with mutual trade and investment falling dramatically or even ceasing, and each country demanding that its allies not cooperate with its rival. Countries in Asia might find themselves under pressure to choose between good relations with the United States and good relations with China. Nonetheless, even under these circumstances, the relationship between the United States and China after an inconclusive war over Taiwan would have important differences from the one between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Unlike the Soviet Union, China is closely integrated into the world economy. With the exception of Japan, most countries in Asia would likely regard the importance of maintaining good relations with Beijing as outweighing any concerns about China having used force against Taiwan. They would resist U.S. pressure to choose between Washington and Beijing, preferring to maintain good relations with both. This logic would apply even more strongly to countries outside the region, which would be even less concerned about China’s use of force.

# Agriculture

Warming’s inevitable even if we cut emissions to zero—multiple studies confirm

Gillett et al 10—director @ the Canadian Centre for Climate Modelling and Analysis

Nathan, “Ongoing climate change following a complete cessation of carbon dioxide emissions”. *Nature Geoscience*

Several recent studies have demonstrated that CO2-induced 17 global mean temperature change is irreversible on human 18 timescales1\_5. We find that not only is this climate change 19 irreversible, but that for some climate variables, such as Antarctic 20 temperature and North African rainfall, CO2-induced climate 21 changes are simulated to continue to worsen for many centuries 22 even after a complete cessation of emissions. Although it is 23 also well known that a large committed thermosteric sea level 24 rise is expected even after a cessation of emissions in 2100, 25 our finding of a strong delayed high-latitude Southern Ocean 26 warming at intermediate depths suggests that this effect may be 27 compounded by ice shelf collapse, grounding line retreat, and ensuing accelerated ice discharge in marine-based sectors of the 28 Antarctic ice sheet, precipitating a sea level rise of several metres. 29 Quantitative results presented here are subject to uncertainties 30 associated with the climate sensitivity, the rate of ocean heat 31 uptake and the rate of carbon uptake in CanESM1, but our 32 findings of Northern Hemisphere cooling, Southern Hemisphere 33 warming, a southward shift of the intertropical convergence zone, 34 and delayed and ongoing ocean warming at intermediate depths 35 following a cessation of emissions are likely to be robust. Geo- 36 engineering by stratospheric aerosol injection has been proposed 37 as a response measure in the event of a rapid melting of the 38 West Antarctic ice sheet24. Our results indicate that if such a 39 melting were driven by ocean warming at intermediate depths, as 40 is thought likely, a geoengineering response would be ineffective 41 for several centuries owing to the long delay associated with 42 subsurface ocean warming.

China makes the impact inevitable and they don’t model

Downs 8

Eric, Fellow @ Brookings, China Energy Fellow, Foreign Policy, John L. Thornton China Center U.S.-China Economic & Security Review Commission, China’s Energy Policies and Their Environmental Impacts, http://www.brookings.edu/testimony/2008/0813\_china\_downs.aspx

China suffers from a disconnect between the increasingly prominent position of energy issues on its domestic and foreign policy agendas and the capacity of the country’s institutions to manage the energy sector. Some Chinese commentators have even argued that the biggest threat to China’s energy security is posed by the very institutions responsible for enhancing it. Consequently, restructuring China’s energy policymaking apparatus has been a subject of intense debate in recent years as the country has grappled with an unexpected surge in energy demand, growing dependence on energy imports, rising global energy prices and periodic domestic energy supply shortages. Authority over China’s energy sector at the national level is fractured among more than a dozen government agencies, the most important of which is the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC). Within the NDRC itself, responsibility for energy is similarly scattered among multiple departments. Prior to the restructuring in March 2008, the key component was the Energy Bureau, which had a broad mandate but lacked the authority, tools and manpower to fulfill it. In 2005, the government added another cook to the kitchen with the establishment of the National Energy Leading Group, an advisory body headed by Premier Wen Jiabao. While the leading group’s creation reflected recognition of the need to strengthen energy sector management, it did not eradicate China’s energy governance woes. China’s fragmented energy policymaking structure has impeded energy governance because there is no single institution, such as a Ministry of Energy, with the authority to coordinate the interests of the various stakeholders. For example, the implementation of energy laws is hampered by the fact that those laws often do not specify the government agencies responsible for implementation because of disputes over who should be in charge. Similarly, the fuel tax that the NPC approved in 1999 has not been implemented because of the failure of the relevant stakeholders to reach an agreement. The policy paralysis within the energy bureaucracy stands in sharp contrast to the activism of China’s state-owned energy companies. These firms are powerful and relatively autonomous actors. Their influence is derived from their full and vice ministerial ranks, the membership of some top executives in the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, industry expertise, internationally listed subsidiaries and profitability (at least until recently). More often than not, it is China’s energy firms who initiate major energy projects and policies that are later embraced by the government, such as the West-East Pipeline and the acquisition of foreign energy assets. The companies also have some capacity to advance corporate interests at the expense of national ones. For example, oil and power generating companies have periodically reduced their output to pressure the government to raise the state-set prices of refined products and electricity, which have not kept pace with increases in the market-determined prices of crude oil and coal. Similarly, China’s national oil companies have ignored guidance from the central government about where they should invest overseas. II. China’s “new” energy policymaking structure The recent changes to China’s energy policymaking apparatus are the latest in a series of institutional reforms aimed at improving energy governance. In March 2008, the NPC approved two additions to China’s energy bureaucracy – the State Energy Commission (SEC) and the National Energy Administration (NEA). The SEC, a high-level discussion and coordination body whose specific functions, organization and staffing have not yet been determined, will replace the National Energy Leading Group. The daily affairs of the SEC will be handled by the NEA, a vice-ministerial component of the NDRC, which is the successor to the NDRC’s Energy Bureau. In addition to the Energy Bureau, the NEA is also comprised of other energy offices from the NDRC, the Office of the National Leading Group, and the nuclear power administration of the Commission of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense. The NEA has a broad mandate, which includes managing the country’s energy industries, drafting energy plans and policies, negotiating with international energy agencies and approving foreign energy investments. The NEA, like its predecessor, will struggle to fulfill its mandate because it lacks the authority, autonomy, manpower and tools to deal with the country’s energy challenges. Although the NEA’s capabilities in each of these areas are greater than those possessed by the NDRC Energy Bureau, they still fall short of what the NEA needs to do its job. Authority: The NEA has more political clout than its predecessor, but not enough to mitigate the bureaucratic infighting that undermines energy decision-making. The NEA is a vice-ministerial body, which is a step above that of the Energy Bureau, which was a bureau-level organization. However, the NEA still does not have the authority it needs to coordinate the interests of ministries, commissions and state-owned energy companies. One of the frustrations of officials in the NDRC Energy Bureau was that the energy companies often undercut their authority by circumventing the Bureau to hold face-to-face discussions with China’s senior leadership. The authority of the NEA is somewhat enhanced by the appointment of Zhang Guobao, a Vice-Chairman of the NDRC with full ministerial rank, as head of the NEA. While it was widely expected that Zhang would retire, his new position is a reflection of his substantial energy expertise. Zhang, who has worked at the NDRC since 1983, is a smart and skillful bureaucrat with encyclopedic knowledge of China’s energy sector. He has overseen the development of some of the country’s major infrastructure projects, including the West-East Pipeline, the transmission of electricity from west to east, the Qinghai-Tibet Railway and the expansion of Beijing Capital International Airport. Autonomy: The NEA is a creature of the NDRC. Some Chinese media reports speculated that the fact that the NEA’s offices will be separate from those of the NDRC and that the NEA will have its own Party Group – which will give the NEA greater autonomy in managing its affairs, including personnel decisions – are signs of the NEA’s independence. However, the fact that Zhang Guobao – an NDRC “lifer” – is head of the NEA and its Party Group indicates that the NEA’s room to maneuver will be constrained by the NDRC. Moreover, the NEA’s independence is limited by the fact that key tools it needs to effectively manage the energy sector are in the hands of the NDRC. Tools: Arguably the greatest constraint on the NEA’s ability to fulfill its mandate is the fact that is does not possess the authority to set energy prices, which remain the purview of the NDRC’s Pricing Department. The issue of who would end up with the power to determine energy prices was, in the words of Zhang Guobao, a subject of “constant dispute” during the bureaucratic reorganization. Although the NEA can make suggestions about energy price adjustments and should be consulted by the NDRC on any proposed changes, the shots are still being called by the NDRC (and ultimately the State Council, whose approval is needed for any major energy price changes). The fact that the NDRC retained control over energy prices is hardly surprising. The power to set prices is one of the NDRC’s main instruments of macroeconomic control, which it understandably is reluctant to relinquish, especially to a subordinate component which might be tempted to adjust energy prices in ways that run counter to broader NDRC objectives, such as combating inflation. The NEA’s lack of authority over energy prices makes its task of mitigating the current electricity shortages, which are partly rooted in price controls, especially challenging. Electricity prices are set by the state, while coal prices are determined by the market. The failure of electricity price increases to keep pace with soaring coal prices has contributed to the national power shortage because some electricity producers can't afford coal while others are unwilling to operate at a loss. With no pricing power, the NEA has little choice but to resort to administrative measures to achieve an objective that would be more effectively realized by raising and ultimately liberalizing electricity prices. Personnel: The central government is still managing the energy sector with a skeleton crew. Contrary to rumors that the NEA’s staff would be as large as 200, it ended up with just 112 people. This staff quota is certainly larger than that of the NDRC Energy Bureau, which had only 50 people, but it does not represent a major increase in the number of people directly involved in managing the energy sector at the national level. Moreover, some Chinese media reports have speculated that the NEA may face the problem of “too many generals and not enough soldiers” because at least half of the 112 slots at the NEA are for positions at the deputy department head level and above. The Party organ that determines the functions, internal structure and staff quotas for government institutions probably resisted calls for more personnel out of concern that if it approved a large staff for the NEA, then other government bodies would also press for more manpower at a time when the State Council is trying to streamline the bureaucracy. In sum, China’s new energy administration is unlikely to substantially improve energy governance.

The organizational changes are tantamount to rearranging deck chairs on the Titanic. Although the energy bureaucracy looks a bit different, its limited capacities remain largely unchanged. Consequently, we can expect to see a continuation of business as usual: conflicts of interest will impede decision-making; the energy companies will remain important drivers of projects and policies; state-set energy prices will continue to contribute to periodic domestic energy supply shortfalls; and the NEA, with no authority to adjust energy prices, probably will resort to “second best” administrative measures to try to eradicate those shortages. The modest tinkering to China’s energy policymaking apparatus unveiled during the March 2008 NPC meeting reflects the conflicts of interest that stymie energy decision-making. Despite widespread recognition among Chinese officials and energy experts of the need to get the country’s energy institutions “right” and the growing chorus of voices calling for the establishment of a Ministry of Energy (MOE), there are powerful ministerial and corporate interests that favor the status quo. The opposition to the creation of a MOE, a hot topic of debate in Chinese energy circles in recent years, was led by the NDRC and the state-owned energy companies. The mere specter of a MOE strikes fear in the heart of the NDRC because it would deprive the NDRC of a substantial portion of its portfolio and important tools of macroeconomic control. The NDRC’s aversion is shared by the energy firms who are reluctant to have another political master and afraid that a MOE would limit their direct access to China’s leadership. Such opposition helps explain why the government was unable to forge a consensus in favor of more robust changes to China’s energy policymaking apparatus. Implications for the United States First, US policymakers should recognize that China’s fractured energy policymaking apparatus may constrain the Chinese government from doing all that US policymakers would like it to do – and indeed what Chinese leaders themselves might want to do – to enhance international energy security and combat climate change. If China falls short of our expectations it may not reflect a conscious decision by Beijing to shirk its global responsibilities but rather the limited capacity of its national energy institutions to bend other actors, notably firms and local governments, to its will.

Adaptation solves the extinction impact

**NIPCC** **11**- Archived 8 March, Surviving the Unprecedented Climate Change of the IPCC, http://www.nipccreport.org/articles/2011/mar/8mar2011a5.html

(Citing: Willis, K.J., Bennett, K.D., Bhagwat, S.A. and Birks, H.J.B. 2010. 4°C and beyond: what did this mean for biodiversity in the past? Systematics and Biodiversity 8: 3-9.)

In a paper published in Systematics and Biodiversity, Willis et al. (2010) consider the IPCC (2007) "predicted climatic changes for the next century" -- i.e., their contentions that "global temperatures will increase by 2-4°C and possibly beyond, sea levels will rise (~1 m ± 0.5 m), and atmospheric CO2 will increase by up to 1000 ppm" -- noting that it is "widely suggested that the magnitude and rate of these changes will result in many plants and animals going extinct," citing studies that suggest that "within the next century, over 35% of some biota will have gone extinct (Thomas et al., 2004; Solomon et al., 2007) and there will be extensive die-back of the tropical rainforest due to climate change (e.g. Huntingford et al., 2008)." On the other hand, they indicate that some biologists and climatologists have pointed out that "many of the predicted increases in climate have happened before, in terms of both magnitude and rate of change (e.g. Royer, 2008; Zachos et al., 2008), and yet biotic communities have remained remarkably resilient (Mayle and Power, 2008) and in some cases thrived (Svenning and Condit, 2008)." But they report that those who mention these things are often "placed in the 'climate-change denier' category," although the purpose for pointing out these facts is simply to present "a sound scientific basis for understanding biotic responses to the magnitudes and rates of climate change predicted for the future through using the vast data resource that we can exploit in fossil records." Going on to do just that, Willis et al. focus on "intervals in time in the fossil record when atmospheric CO2 concentrations increased up to 1200 ppm, temperatures in mid- to high-latitudes increased by greater than 4°C within 60 years, and sea levels rose by up to 3 m higher than present," describing studies of past biotic responses that indicate "the scale and impact of the magnitude and rate of such climate changes on biodiversity." And what emerges from those studies, as they describe it, "is evidence for rapid community turnover, migrations, development of novel ecosystems and thresholds from one stable ecosystem state to another." And, most importantly in this regard, they report "there is very little evidence for broad-scale extinctions due to a warming world." In concluding, the Norwegian, Swedish and UK researchers say that "based on such evidence we urge some caution in assuming broad-scale extinctions of species will occur due solely to climate changes of the magnitude and rate predicted for the next century," reiterating that "the fossil record indicates remarkable biotic resilience to wide amplitude fluctuations in climate."

**It’s natural anyways**

**Carter et. Al 12–** Robert, PhD, Adjuct Research Fellow, James Cook University, Craig Idso, PhD, Chairman at the Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change, Fred Singer, PhD, President of the Science and Environmental Policy Project, Susan Crockford, evolutionary biologist with a specialty in skeletal taxonomy , paleozoology and vertebrate evolution, Joseph D’Aleo, 30 years of experience in professional meteorology, former college professor of Meteorology at Lyndon State College, Indur Goklany, independent scholar, author, and co-editor of the Electronic Journal of Sustainable Development, Sherwood Idso, President of the Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change, Research Physicist with the US Department of Agriculture, Adjunct Professor in the Departments of Geology, Botany, and Microbiology at Arizona State University, Bachelor of Physics, Master of Science, and Doctor of Philosophy, all from the University of Minnesota, Madhav Khandekar, former research scientist from Environment Canada and is an expert reviewer for the IPCC 2007 Climate Change Panel, Anthony Lupo, Department Chair and Professor of Atmospheric Science at the University of Missouri, Willie Soon, astrophysicist at the Solar and Stellar Physics Division of the Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics, Mitch Taylor (Canada) (February 2012, “Eight Centuries of Climate Change in Northeast Spain” <http://www.nipccreport.org/articles/2012/feb/8feb2012a3.html>

According to Morellon *et al*. (2011), "in the context of present-day global warming, there is increased interest in documenting climate variability during the last millennium," since "it is crucial to reconstruct pre-industrial conditions to discriminate anthropogenic components (i.e., greenhouse gases, land-use changes) from natural forcings (i.e., solar variability, volcanic emissions)." Against this backdrop, Morellon *et al*. conducted a multi-proxy study of several short sediment cores they recovered from Lake Estanya (42°02'N, 0°32'E) in the Pre-Pyrenean Ranges of northeast Spain, which "provides a detailed record of the complex environmental, hydrological and anthropogenic interactions occurring in the area since medieval times." More specifically, they say that "the integration of sedimentary facies, elemental and isotopic geochemistry, and biological proxies (diatoms, chironomids and pollen), together with a robust chronological control, provided by AMS radiocarbon dating and 210Pb and 137Cs radiometric techniques, enabled precise reconstruction of the main phases of environmental change, associated with the Medieval Warm Period (MWP), the Little Ice Age (LIA) and the industrial era." And what did they find? The thirteen researchers identified the MWP as occurring in their record from AD 1150 to 1300, noting that their pollen data reflect "warmer and drier conditions," in harmony with the higher temperatures of the Iberian Peninsula over the same time period that have been documented by Martinez-Cortizas *et al*. (1999), the higher temperatures of the Western Mediterranean region found by Taricco *et al*. (2008), and the global reconstructions of Crowley and Lowery (2000) and Osborn and Briffa (2006), which "clearly document warmer conditions from the twelfth to fourteenth centuries," which warmth, in the words of Morellon *et al*. is "likely related to increased solar irradiance (Bard *et al*., 2000), persistent La Niña-like tropical Pacific conditions, a warm phase of the Atlantic Multidecadal Oscillation, and a more frequent positive phase of the North Atlantic Oscillation (Seager *et al*., 2007)." Following hard on the heels of the MWP, Morellon *et al*. note the occurrence of the LIA, which they recognize as occurring from AD 1300 to 1850. And here they report that, on the Iberian Peninsula, "lower temperatures (Martinez-Cortizas *et al*., 1999) characterize this period," which "coincided with colder North Atlantic (Bond *et al*., 2001) and Mediterranean sea surface temperatures (Taricco *et al*., 2008) and a phase of mountain glacier advance (Wanner *et al*., 2008)." And following the LIA they identify the transition period of AD 1850-2004 that takes the region into the Current Warm Period. In discussing all three of these distinctive periods, they say that "a comparison of the main hydrological transitions during the last 800 years in Lake Estanya and solar irradiance (Bard *et al*., 2000) reveals that lower lake levels dominated during periods of enhanced solar activity (MWP and post-1850 AD) and higher lake levels during periods of diminished solar activity (LIA)." And *within* the LIA, they note that periods of higher lake levels or evidence of increased water balance occurred during the solar minima of Wolf (AD 1282-1342), Sporer (AD 1460-1550), Maunder (AD 1645-1715) and Dalton (AD 1790-1830). In light of these several observations it would appear that the multi-centennial climate oscillation uncovered by Morellon *et al*. has been driven by a similar oscillation in solar activity, as well as by multi-decadal solar activity fluctuations superimposed upon that longer-period oscillation. And these relationships suggest that there is no compelling need to attribute 20th-century global warming to the concomitant increase in the air's CO2 content. Natural variability appears quite capable of explaining it all.

**The Cuban Embargo has led to a self-sufficient agriculture industry free of pesticides and GMO’s**

Aguilar, PhD., Agro-ecologist, 2009

[Fernando Funes, 5/24/09, Food First- institute for Food and Development Policy, “Transgenic Food Production in Cuba; The Need for a Participatory and Serious Debate”, <http://www.foodfirst.org/en/node/2451>, Accessed: 7/1/13, PR]

Evidence and recent history show that no other country has had the opportunity that Cuba has had to implement an effective agro-ecological model on a national scale. No other country has seen the specific circumstances that have occurred here (in Cuba), where optimal conditions have been created for a transition of such magnitude. The social capital, along with the human development index, puts us in a privileged position. Numerous studies conducted in Cuba show that agro-ecological systems could provide more than enough food necessary to satisfy the Cuban demand in a sustainable manner, with minimal dependence on inputs, without damaging the ecosystem and, most importantly, without negative effects on human health. It has been soundly demonstrated that agro-ecological systems, based on biodiversity and focused on local development and the intensive use of natural resources, are more efficient and productive than conventional systems. They have also been shown to be more economically feasible and socially just. It is satisfying to see how, with modesty and work, the agro-ecological paradigm is growing and becoming stronger in Cuba, demonstrating what can be done to produce healthy and ample food for our population. Who can doubt the impact reached by the urban and peri-urban agriculture movement that came from the popular movement organized in the early nineties as a citizen’s response to the lack of food? This movement now involves some 380,000 people. Who can doubt the contribution of the campesino sector to Cuban agriculture in the last few years? The agro-ecological advancements made by the farmer-to-farmer movement are impossible to deny and the cooperative and farmer sector succeeded in producing more than 65% of the food produced in the country with only 25% of the land. There is a solid scientific basis demonstrated in hundreds of congresses, symposiums and workshops that has laid the groundwork for developing a feasible model for Cuba and has demonstrated what can be accomplished, even under the most difficult circumstances. The accumulated knowledge and the studies underway guarantee the success of the Cuban transition to more sustainable agricultural systems and have caught the eye of the international community, especially because of the environmental, economic, financial and energy crisis that the world is facing today. A growing number of members of the Cuban scientific community, academics, farmers and other organizational forms of agricultural production are more and more convinced that the agro-ecological paradigm offers a sustainable future for the production of food and for the appreciation of Cuban agriculture.

**Cuba is the global model for sustainable agriculture—overwhelms your internal links**

**Barclay 03** [Eliza Barclay, “Cuba's security in fresh produce,” Food First, September 12th, 2003, pg. http://www.foodfirst.org/node/1208

The news of Cuba's success has been slowly leaking out since the early 1990s, and the country is beginning to take on **legendary status as a model** for sustainable agriculture and local food production in the eyes of environmental advocates, farmers, and development specialists. Already lauded for years by the steady stream of sustainable farming gurus from around the world who have made the pilgrimage to observe the success of organic and local food production, Cuba's experiment with sustainable agriculture has succeeded beyond its trial period.

American farmers have been shuttled to Cuba in "fact-finding missions" and "reality tours" by crafty NGOs who have obtained the highly coveted U.S. Department of Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) licenses allowing them to sponsor travel to Cuba for educational purposes. Whether many of these trips will be allowed to continue is unclear; in March 2003, OFAC announced the end of people-to-people exchanges. Most groups who have had the appropriate licenses are scheduled to lose them by December 2003.

But a rapidly approaching future of **shifting economic opportunities** poses serious questions and potential risks to this **Cuba’s model**, regarded as precious by so many of its advocates.

Removing sanctions means US corporations floods markets killing sustainability.

Warwick, Environmental Writer for BBC Wildlife, 2000

[Hugh, 3/18/00, Third World Network, “Cuba’s organic revolution”, <http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/twr118h.htm>, Accessed: 6/30/13, PR]

Cuba has taken enormous strides towards agricultural self-reliance without chemical inputs and without large-scale corporate or State control, and has shown that international food aid is not the only alternative to food shortages. But this is not an Arcadian idyll. While Cuba could be a model to the rest of the world, there is the risk of what Jules Pretty describes as ‘The Empire Striking Back’. Not all of Castro’s old guard is converted to this green future.19 And Cuba is also involved in the development of biotechnology. Already it is being used on the local level, and there is no evidence that Cuba will join the call for a GMO(genetically modified organism)-free world Ð though at least in Cuba they are free of the corporate control which blemishes the science elsewhere. There is also, ironically, the worry about what would happen if the US embargo were to be lifted. In the event of a trade free-for-all, Cuba’s tentative steps towards environmental sustainability could be trampled under the feet of the Cuban exiles returning to claim the land and homes that were once theirs, and the US corporations flooding the island with their goods.

**Trade normalization would doubles the number of tourists in Cuba.**

**Dean 7,** Lecturer in Environmental Studies at Brown University, 2007

(Cornelia, “Conserving Cuba, After the Embargo,” *New York Times*, December 25, Online: <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/25/science/25cuba.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1&>)

But, he said in an interview, “**an invasion of U.S. consumerism, a U.S.-dominated future, could roll over it like a bulldozer” when the embargo ends.** By some estimates, tourism in Cuba is increasing 10 percent annually. At a minimum, Orlando Rey Santos, the Cuban lawyer who led the law-writing effort, said in an interview at the conference, **“we can guess that tourism is going to increase in a very fast way” when the embargo ends. “It is estimated we could double tourism in one year,”** said Mr. Rey, who heads environmental efforts at the Cuban ministry of science, technology and environment.